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This article explores the major approaches to the study of conflict reso-
lution strategy from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives. It argues that 
conflict resolution strategy, as a civil integration resource, is a necessary tool 
for overcoming the deep­rooted ethnic conflicts in the unstable North Cau-
casus. This research analyzes how the strength of civil integration can affect 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The author considers the essential fac-
tors of protracted ethnic conflicts and emphasizes the destabilizing role of the 
repoliticization of ethnicity in a crisis society. The concept of ethnic, “identi-
ty­based” conflicts is the heuristic theoretical model of exploring causes for 
increased ethnoreligious tensions in the North Caucasus. This article focuses 
on the ability of conflict resolution strategy to de­escalate growing tensions 
and transform protracted identity­based conflicts. The need to stimulate civil 
integration is caused by moral and structural causes: from the ethical point 
of view, the creation of an inclusive society is the fundamental societal goal; 
structural factors are related to the need to reduce inequalities and differences 
leading to social fragmentation and an escalation of ethnic conflicts. Among 
the structural conditions of regional conflicts, the author names ethnosocial 
inequalities, a civil identity crisis, ethnopolitical neo­authoritarianism, a 
large­scale socioeconomic polarization and an “ideological combat” between 
secular modernization and religious fundamentalism. 
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Introduction
This article reviews the present state of analysis of ethno­regional 
conflict resolution in political science. The goal of the research is to 
analyse the constructive methods and peace­building strategies for 
resolving ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus region. The collapse 
of the USSR, the “sovereignization” of the ethnopolitical subjects of 
the Russian Federation, the destruction of inter­regional social and 
economic relations, the strengthening of ethnonationalistic tenden-
cies have all been significant factors of imbalances in the position of 
the Russian regions, their disintegration of an all­Russian space. It is 
necessary to agree with the opinion of a number of Russian political 
scientists, who believe that ethnic societies and ethnopolitical elites 
find it more profitable to quit the way of legal, administrative and 
political leveling between regional and national components of their 
identity, which was typical for imperial and especially the Soviet pe-
riod of Russian history, and to wend the way of accentuation of these 
differences.1 The Russian ethnopolitical experience of the 1990s 
shows that the conflict mobilization of an ethnoregional identity can 
be used by political forces in different interests. In the situation of a 
civil identity crisis and the lack of democratic ideas, the consolida-
tion of civil society, updated and focused on the region forms of eth-
noreligious identity, may be accompanied by a conflict identification 
with the “big” Russian society.
A number of explanations have been suggested for the recent 
surge of violence in the North Caucasus. The dire economic situation 
in the region, the spread of separatist ideology and radical Islam, as 
well as corruption have been cited among the main reasons behind 
the escalation of violence in the North Caucasus.2 This research does 
1 Nemirovsky V., “Characteristics of Social and Cultural Self­Identity of the Population 
of Eastern Siberia,” Sociological Studies 8, 2011, pp. 88–94. 
2 Shlapentokh D., “The Rise of the Chechen Emirate?” Middle East Quarterly 15 (3), 
2008, pp. 49–56.
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not altogether reject the abovementioned factors: instead its purpose 
is to suggest a yet another reason for the increase of conflict­related 
violence in recent years. The aforementioned hypothesis linking 
the decline of civil integration and civil society with the growth of 
ethnoreligious violence in the North Caucasus can be a contribution 
to the research of regional conflict resolution. Civil integration in 
the North Caucasus is a poorly researched topic. Only a handful 
of research works have ever been published on the issue3 with a 
few reports by international organizations (Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, Nonviolence International).4 
Today, the North Caucasus remains a crucially strategic and 
geopolitical macroregion, as it forms the southern volatile frontier of 
Russia. In the wider perspective, the North Caucasus is a key factor 
for the social stability and political integration of the whole Russia. 
Russia’s communications with the Transcaucasia and, by extension, 
its ability to exert influence on the three independent republics of the 
region are dependent on stability in the North Caucasus. The war in 
Chechnya has shown the vulnerability of Russia to ethnic separatism 
and Islamic fundamentalism in the North Caucasus. Furthermore, 
it has highlighted the question of Russia’s survival in its present 
territorial structure. The latent and potential Chechen conflict is only 
the most prominent among the contemporary challenges to civil and 
ethnic peace in the region. There are several serious problems that 
need to be addressed promptly to secure the fragile, newly­achieved 
semblance of stability in the North Caucasus. First, it is the promoting 
3 Hansen G., Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide for Practitioners, Humani-
tarian and War Project & Local Capacities for Peace Project, Brown University: The 
Institute for International Studies, 1998, 200 p.
4 Amnesty International, Russian Federation: Rule without Law: Human Rights 
Violations in the North Caucasus, July 2009; Human Rights Watch, World Report 
2010: Events of 2009, 2010; Nonviolence International, North Caucasus Regional 
Peacebuilding Program of Civil Organizations Based on Subregional Peacebuilding 
Action Agenda of North Caucasus NGOs, Moscow 2005; Nonviolence International, 
Operational and Methodological Implementation of Multi-Sector Peacebuilding 
Programs, Moscow 2010.
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of multilevel and functional civil integration. As Russia has not yet 
matured to the point of being able to handle ethnic grievances in an 
effective way, the prospects for stable peace seem dim – unless open, 
democratic institutions and conflict resolution approaches are begun 
to be used to further this purpose.5
This article will try to answer the research question that is based 
on the hypothesis that numerous unresolved ethnic conflicts hold 
implications for stability and complicate regional security. It will 
argue that ethnic, “identity­based” conflicts, based on deep social 
disintegration, bring security risks for the multiethnic Russian region 
of North Caucasus. The purpose is to draw conclusions based on an 
interdisciplinary analysis of conflict resolution strategy in the North 
Caucasus and try to determine how protracted ethnic conflicts can be 
resolved and transformed as a functional component, conducive to 
the region’s civil integration.
The hypothesis is that conflict resolution strategy, based on in-
clusive civil integration, is a highly effective North Caucasus peace-
building resource. Regional conflict resolution must serve as an inte-
grational and preventive tool for the conflict environment by way of 
providing structural solutions for deep­rooted, sociocultural antago-
nisms as well as by transforming and rationalizing ethnoregional con-
tradictions. The objective is to establish how certain elements within 
protracted, identify­based ethnic conflicts add to the growing com-
plexity of the region’s security and its potential destabilization. The 
methodological framework is based on two complementary methods: 
a detailed analysis of the main theoretical sources, literature and an 
analysis of empirical data. By reviewing the ethnopolitical processes 
and issues, we will also look at the North Caucasus region’s socio-
cultural background for an insight into the past causal connections of 
deep­rooted, identity­based conflicts.
5 Cornell S., “Conflicts in the North Caucasus,” Central Asian Survey 17 (3), 1998, 
pp. 409–441.
92 P O L I T O L O G I J A  2 0 1 7 / 3  ( 8 7 )
1. Conflict Resolution as Methodological Paradigm: 
Theoretical Background, Methodology and Data Sources
According to D. Sandole, 
There are those in conflict analysis and resolution who deal with startup 
conditions and those who deal with process. Practitioners intervening 
into conflicts­as­process may deal not only initially but only with process. 
The problem is, once the fire has been put out, unless the underlying 
startup conditions – the incendiary materials – are dealt with, the fire 
may reoccur.6
Although the conflicts that have attracted most international 
attention in the post­Cold War era have been those of the Trans­
caucasus, another area of both potential and actual turmoil is the 
North Caucasus. The first example of serious ethnic conflicts in the 
area is the war in Chechnya. However, the existence of this war, 
and its astonishing cruelty and devastation, has been instrumental in 
obscuring the other grievances that exist in the North Caucasus and 
that have the potential to escalate into open ethnic conflict. Ethnic 
conflict in the North Caucasus includes a wide range of phenomena 
and often masks the unequal distribution of economic or political 
power, the religious identification of the parties, the language 
conflict, control over land and territory. Historically, ethnopolitical 
and ethnoterritorial conflicts can be divided into two main categories, 
which spill over into one another. The first kind of destructive ethnic 
conflicts are those among the ethnopolitical groups of the region; the 
second kind are conflicts between ethnic communities and Russia. 
The main example of the unrest in the North Caucasus has been 
the short but bloody war between the Ingush and the Ossetians. 
However, this war distinguishes itself only by being the only one 
of ethnoterritorial conflicts in the region that has escalated into war. 
6 Sandole D., “A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A 
Three Pillar Approach,” Peace and Conflict Research 5 (2), 1998, pp. 34–65.
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As S. Cornell notes, among the fundamental problems, three issues 
call for special attention: “First and perhaps most pressingly, the bid 
for unity of the Lezgian people in Dagestan and Azerbaijan; second, 
the latent problem between the Turkic Karachai and the Circasssian 
peoples in the two neighbor republics of Karachaevo­Cherkessia and 
Kabardino­Balkaria; and thirdly the condition of the most complex 
of all the North Caucasian republics: Dagestan.”7
In 2014, the North Caucasus was estimated to contain between 
close to one thousand and several thousand militants.8 Estimates 
of the number of insurgents in Chechnya vary between as few as a 
dozen or so and just over one hundred. Some experts believe that they 
are mostly found in the border regions of Dagestan and Ingushetia, 
mostly operating in these neighboring republics. The insurgents are 
mainly active in Dagestan, and in previous years they have also 
been active in Ingushetia.9 By the mid­2010s, the North Caucasus 
resistance movement has become religiously motivated and evolved 
from a local militant organization into a branch of the worldwide 
militant Islamist movement.10 According to M. Falkowski, the 
insurgents identify with the global umma – the worldwide community 
of Muslims – and the most essential element of their present ideology 
is “Islamicness.”11
7 Cornell S., “Conflicts in the North Caucasus,” Central Asian Survey 17 (3), 1998, 
p. 410.
8 Górecki W., “No Change in the Russian Caucasus: The Winter Olympics amid a 
Local War,” OSW – Center for Eastern Studies. Point of View 47 (1), 2014, p. 46.
9 Danish Immigration Service, “Security and Human Rights in Chechnya and the 
Situation of Chechens in the Russian Federation – Residence Registration, Racism 
and False Accusations,” Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s Fact-finding 
Mission to Moscow, Grozny and Volgograd, the Russian Federation 1, 2015, 
pp. 20–34.
10 Górecki W., “No Change in the Russian Caucasus: The Winter Olympics amid a 
Local War,” OSW – Center for Eastern Studies. Point of View 47 (1), 2014, p. 51.
11 Falkowski M., “On the Periphery of Global Jihad. The North Caucasus: The Illusion 
of Stabilization,” OSW – Center for Eastern Studies. Point of View 45 (11), 2014, 
p. 98.
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Today the North Caucasus differs fundamentally from the resis-
tance movement of the “Dudayev era.” Ethnic separatism has been 
replaced by religious fundamentalism, the founding of an Islamic 
state and so­called defensive jihad, which strives to expel infidels 
from “Muslim land.” Sociocultural disintegration, large­scale esca-
lation of ethnoreligious violence and the collapse of civil society in 
the North Caucasus are becoming a serious problem in Russia, expe­
riencing a new era of deep political transit.
The role of civil integration in conflict resolution and peacebuil­
ding is not a new topic for research. However, no studies have been 
done so far to analyze the role of civil integration in ethnic conflict 
resolution in the North Caucasus. The spillover of ethnopolitical con-
flict from the Chechen Republic to the rest of the region is a recent 
phenomenon and the escalation of ethnoreligious violence, which 
engulfed the region in the last years, has hardly ever been noticed 
by the international community. The most comprehensive analysis 
of recent violence in the North Caucasus to date has been conducted 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which 
has compiled a series of comprehensive reports on the situation in the 
North Caucasus in its Human Rights and Security Initiative Project.12 
The possibility of community dialogue via alternative conflict resolu-
tion is mentioned by R. Gendron13 and advanced onto the reconci­
liation level by K. Bakke.14 However, no studies have been done so 
far on the possibility of applying an integrational peacebuilding and 
conflict resolution approach in the North Caucasus. Therefore, the 
12 Aliyev H. Aid, “Efficiency in an Armed Conflict. The Role of Civil Society in the 
Escalation of Violence in the North Caucasus,” IFHV Working Paper 1 (1), 2011, 
pp. 40–54.
13 Gendron R. “Alternative Dispute Resolution in the North Caucasus,” Caucasian 
Review of International Affairs 3 (4), 2009, p. 77.
14 Bakke K., “Reconciliation in Conflict­Affected Societies: Multilevel Modeling of 
Individual and Contextual Factors in the North Caucasus of Russia,” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 99 (5), 2009, p. 45.
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research, conducted in this article, can serve as an analytical contri-
bution to this field of study. J. Senehi notes:
To recognize the complexity of intercommunal conflicts is not only 
analytically sound, but has practical implications. Conflicts’ complexity 
is double­edged. Complexity contributes to conflict perpetuation and 
intractability. But simultaneously, this suggests multiple arenas for 
intervention, multiple agents of intervention, and multiple intervention 
tasks in a dynamic process of social change.15
This research intends to apply a twofold methodological approach:
1)  Comprehensive analysis aimed at scrutinizing qualitative 
sets of data derived from media sources as well as scholarly 
publications and academic research in the field;
2)  Conflict process tracing as a summary of social developments 
leading to the current situation. By tracing the events that have 
played a significant role in the generation and escalation of 
ethnic conflicts in the North Caucasus, this study attempts to 
explain peacebuilding patterns and conflict resolution strategy.
The article pursues the goal of analyzing how the strength or 
collapse of civil integration can affect conflict resolution and peace-
building in an instable, multiethnic region. It suggests that the lack 
of bottom­up peace efforts emanating from within the community 
and civil society levels (rather than state initiatives from top­down) 
is one of the main causes for the failure of conflict resolution, which, 
in conjunction with increased state interventionism, leads to the dra-
matic escalation of violence in the case under study. The main ar-
gument of this study suggests that the key to the growth/reduction 
of ethnic violence in the context of the North Caucasus lies at the 
community level. In A. Curle’s opinion: “Since conflict resolution by 
outside bodies and individuals has so far proved ineffective (in the 
chaotic conditions of contemporary ethnic conflict – particularly, but 
not exclusively, in Somalia, Eastern Europe and the former USSR), 
15 Senehi J., “Constructive Storytelling: A Peace Process,” Peace and Conflict Studies 
9 (2), 2002, pp. 41–63.
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it is necessary to consider the peacemaking potential within the con-
flicting communities themselves.”16 For that purpose, the concept of 
indigenous empowerment17 is adopted here as part of the conflict 
resolution strategy – bottom­up peacebuilding, i.e., peace processes 
starting at the civil­integrational level. The innovative conflict reso-
lution approach of bottom­up peacebuilding, suggested by A. Curle 
and J. Lederach, assumes that peace processes should originate at the 
grassroots and, consequently, develop into higher levels of integra-
tion and political dialog. As stated by J. Lederach, “the principle of 
indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must 
actively envision, include, respect, integrate and promote the human 
and cultural resources from within a given setting.”18 “Bottom­up 
peacebuilding” is aimed at the conflict resolution strategy from the 
grassroots rather than top­down and its goal is to create human secu-
rity and strengthen the rule of law by enhancing local civil structures. 
Sometimes there is no opportunity for a formal, higher, macropoliti-
cal level conflict resolution due to the dispersed nature of the insur-
gency and a lack of credible leadership, coupled with the unwilling-
ness of the federal government to accept the very existence of the 
conflict.19 Another new concept in the theory of conflict resolution 
may be the concept of cultural diplomacy, which “is based on such 
scientific concepts as soft power and mutual cultural interaction. It is 
important to note that in accordance with the national cultural charac-
teristics of countries, there are different practices of interpreting the 
term cultural diplomacy.”20
16 Curle A., “New Challenges for Citizen Peacemaking,” Medicine and War 10 (2), 
1994, pp. 96–105. 
17 Lederach J., Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Wa­
shington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 75.
18 Ibid., p. 89.
19 Aliyev H. Aid, “Efficiency in an Armed Conflict. The Role of Civil Society in the 
Escalation of Violence in the North Caucasus,” IFHV Working Paper 1 (1), 2011, 
p. 77.
20 Pipchenko N., Moskalenko T., “Promotion of Ukraine’s Cultural Diplomacy in the 
EU,” Politologija 2 (86), 2017, p. 125.
97M. Popov. MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CONSTRUCTIVE  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
The theoretical tradition of analyzing conflict resolution strategy 
as a civil integration resource is associated with a “conceptual anta­
gonism” of conflict theories, multiculturalism and neofunctionalism, 
i.e., the contradiction is in interpreting the essence of integration as 
a way of de­escalating certain deep­rooted, ethnic conflicts in plu-
ralistic societies. Conflict theorists refer to the analysis of conflict 
specifics of ethnicity, multiculturalists rely on the normative essence 
of ascriptive ethnic identification, and neofunctionalists interpret the 
status and civil rights of ethnic groups from the point of equal oppor-
tunities and integration imperativeness. The comprehensive theory 
of ethnic conflict must explain why ethnic relations, which are based 
on peace and integration, are more typical than widespread violence, 
despite serious tensions.21 According to J. Burton, 
Conflict resolution has been a neglected subject. It is a challenge to 
all existing capitalist, communist, or other systems. It is a process that 
can deal with complex situations, both national and international. Its 
interactive analytical problem­solving processes have been tested and 
show enormous promise. But the resolution of particular conflicts is 
just a small beginning. While it helps to provide insights into the nature 
of conflict and conditions that stimulate conflict, by itself it does not 
deal with the problem of conflict. Conflict provention is the goal. Both 
are part of a process of system change, and their theoretical framework 
points political systems in the directions required.22
More recently, scholars have tried to better understand the nego-
tiation and conflict resolution dynamics in civil, ethnic, religious and 
regional conflicts, where parties have turned to negotiated approa­
ches to resolve their differences even after prolonged fighting. Un-
like those in the past, the majority of conflicts during the last decade 
of the 20th century ended in negotiated settlements, usually with the 
21 Rothman J., Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: In Nations, Organizations, and 
Communities, San Francisco: Jossey­Bass Publishers, 1997, 267 p.
22 Burton J., Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict. A Handbook, Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1987, p. 40.
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assistance of a third party.23 Various explanations have been offered 
to explain this recent trend. According to R. Licklider, “We have 
some evidence that long civil wars are disproportionately likely to be 
ended with negotiated settlements rather than military victory. This 
is plausible since a long civil war means that neither side has been 
able to achieve a military victory.”24 Many of the civil and regional 
disputes that ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s were relatively 
prolonged affairs, having been aided and propelled by the two super-
powers. The desire to end these so­called “proxy wars” as the Cold 
War wound down encouraged the superpowers to pursue negotiated 
solutions so that they could exit, because continuation had become 
increasingly costly.25
In conflict resolution theory, an important assumption is that al-
though parties may identify specific issues as the causes of conflict, 
conflict also reflects subjective, phenomenological and social frac-
tures. Consequently, analyzing “interests” may be less useful than 
identifying the underlying needs that govern each identity group’s 
perception of the conflict.26 The seminal research on intergroup rela-
tions is decades old, but its insights were “discovered” for the first 
23 Babbitt E., “The Evolution of International Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to 
Peacebuilding,” Negotiation Journal 25 (4), 2009, p. 539.
24 Licklider R., Comparative Studies of Long Wars. In Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing 
Cases of Intractability, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2005, p. 47.
25 Crocker C., High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood, 
New York: W.W. Norton, 1992, 280 p.; Crocker C., Hampson F., Aall P., Taming 
Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases, Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2004, 316 p.; Weiss T., The United Nations and Civil 
Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1996, 347 p.
26 Burton J., Dukes F., Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1990, 470 p.; Lederach J., Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation 
in Divided Societies, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, 
238 p.; Kelman H., The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach. In Managing Global 
Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, 279 p.
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time by political analysts grappling with internal ethnic wars. This 
included a new look at prejudice reduction and social categoriza-
tion studies27 as well as research on identity formation – ethnic, re-
ligious, racial, tribal.28 In an identity­based conflict’s approach, the 
ethnic identity is considered as one of the basic human needs, while 
the group identity’s threat is represented as one of the group safety 
risks.29 Moreover, two key needs are distinguished: the need for iden-
tity and need for safety. According to J. Rothman, irrationality, deep 
subjectivity and uncontrollability of identity­based conflicts are the 
crucial attributes of such conflicts.30 The motives for ethnoconfes-
sional groups to be involved in deep­rooted, identity­based conflicts 
will affect the solution perspectives of such conflicts; for the sake of 
satisfying their material interests, people would hardly risk their lives 
consciously. In ethnosecessionist conflicts, at least one side could 
be identified as belonging to a culturally distinct (ethnic/religious) 
group or at least mobilized on behalf of this group. The North Cauca-
sian conflicts belong to this category. Cases of ethnic conflicts in their 
“pure form” – with one group acting against another because of some 
“natural” hostility – are rarely encountered, although as violence es-
27 Brewer M., Gaertner S., “Toward Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and 
Social Categorization,” Brewer M., Hewstone M. (eds.), Self and Social Identity,  Ox-
ford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004, 410 p.; Pettigrew T., Tropp L., “A Meta­Analytic 
Test of Intergroup Contact Theory.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
90 (5), 2006, pp. 751–783.
28 Laitin D., Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near 
Abroad, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, 430 p.; Appleby R.., The Ambi-
valence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, Lanham, MD: Row-
man and Littlefield, 2000, 321 p.; Marshall M., Gurr T., Peace and Conflict, College 
Park, MD.: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Univer-
sity of Maryland, 2005, 460 p.
29 Rothman J., Alberstein M., “Individuals, Groups and Intergroups: Understanding the 
Role of Identity in Conflict and Its Creative Engagement,” Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 28 (3), 2013, pp. 631–659. 
30 Rothman J., Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: In Nations, Organizations, and 
Commu nities, San Francisco: Jossey­Bass Publishers, 1997, 267 p.
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calates, ethnic or religious affiliation can emerge as the sole elective 
principle in the choice of victims.31
As J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk, and I. Zartman explain, conflict 
resolution is a “vibrant, interdisciplinary field where theory and 
practice pace real­world events.”32 They note further:
Scholars working on CR study the phenomenon of conflict and analyze 
ways to bring it under control, bringing their insights and concepts to 
bear on actual conflicts, be they domestic or international, so as to foster 
better and more effective relations between states and people. Conflict 
Resolution is about ideas, theories, and methods that can improve 
our understanding of conflict and our collective practice of reduction 
in violence and enhancement of political processes for harmonizing 
interests.33
Interdisciplinary methodology allows for analyzing the ethnic 
conflict/civil integration dialectics as a complex phenomenon, 
conditioned by a diversity of social, ethnic, cultural and political 
factors. At the stage of studying the structural causes of ethnic tension 
escalation in the North Caucasus, an important methodological 
basis is the concept of “identity­based conflicts” by J. Burton and 
J. Rothman. It allows to determine identity­based conflicts as social 
ones by their form (occurring between social subjects of various levels) 
and as value­ideological conflicts by their content, relying on cultural 
distinctions.34 Conflict resolution theory focuses its attention on the 
capacity of civil integration to transform the destructive “identity­
31 Tishkov V., Understanding Violence for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Chechnya, 
Geneva: Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN), 2009, 
340 p.
32 Bercovitch J., Kremenyuk V., Zartman I., “Introduction: The Nature of Conflict 
and Conflict Resolution,” Bercovitch J., Kremenyuk V., Zartman I. W. (eds.), The 
Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers, 2009, 
p. 100.
33 Ibid., p. 3.
34 Rothman J., Alberstein M., “Individuals, Groups and Inter groups: Understanding the 
Role of Identity in Conflict and Its Creative Engagement,” Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 28 (3), 2013, pp. 631–659. 
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based conflicts” into constructive conflicts of interests. According 
J. Burton, 
Resolving one conflict, however, does not prevent the next one. 
Conflict resolution, unlike dispute settlement, is not primarily or even 
mainly concerned with particular cases. Its processes are analytical and 
problem­solving, and its approach is within a theoretical framework 
or explanation of conflict. Its main thrust is, therefore, not merely in 
conflict prevention, in isolating and removing the sources of conflict, 
but also in conflict ‘provention’: promoting the conditions that create 
cooperative relationships.35
If policy makers want to get successful in discovering causes of 
ethnic “identity­based” conflicts, they have to start with a definition 
that will lead to constructive methods of conflict resolution. As 
J. Rothman notes, “we consider the ethnic identity to be a self­
perception that is filled with “cul tural formula”: it is based on cultural 
needs and preferences, group characteristics and collective values.36 
In the North Caucasus, cultural “hyper­identity” may be of a group 
or an inter­group; however, it is always the source of negative 
cultural stereotypes and ethnic conflict catalyst. The conflict parties 
may perceive themselves as personal maximizers, while protecting 
individual values, pursuing their own interests and expressing 
individu alistic needs; they may be ethnic groups and feel like they 
are a part of collective whole; they may feel like they are carriers 
of multiple cultural identities and get involved in the conflict at 
the inter­group level. In the North Caucasus, these perceptions are 
generated by the “cultural formula” and ethnic “hyper­identities,” 
which become ideological, religious, ethnopolitical bases of conflict 
parties with personal, group and inter­group emotions and meanings.
35 Burton J., Dukes F., Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 93.
36 Rothman J., Alberstein M., “Individuals, Groups and Intergroups: Understanding the 
Role of Identity in Conflict and Its Creative Engagement,” Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 28 (3), 2013, p. 647.
102 P O L I T O L O G I J A  2 0 1 7 / 3  ( 8 7 )
2. Between Ethnoreligious Conflicts and Social  
Disintegration: The Role of Islamic Revival  
in the North Caucasus
By the end of the Soviet Union, Caucasian Muslims were rediscove­
ring their previously suppressed religious identity, an identity that was 
completely denied by Soviet social engineering. Folk Islam was le-
gitimized as “traditional,” an integral part of their ethnocultural iden-
tity, but also vital for self­identification. During the 1990s, Caucasus 
witnessed a growing number of young Muslims attending mosques 
regularly, observing fasts and performing daily prayers, travelling and 
studying Islam abroad, thus expanding their individual knowledge 
and understanding of Islam. Notwithstanding, the social and political 
impact has been different in each region of the Caucasus. It was more 
intensive in the North­East (Dagestan­Chechnya­Ingushetia), due 
to the strong Sufi presence, which withstood the decades of Soviet 
atheism, and less intensive in the North­West (Kabardino­Balkaria, 
Karachay­Circassia and Adygea), where the mosque­centered Isla­
mic tradition had been suppressed. However, the First Chechen War 
triggered an Islamization of politics throughout the Caucasus, spar­
king memories of Islamic resistance to Russia and attracting Muslim 
volunteers from abroad. Nowadays, not only are people more con-
scious of their Muslim identity, but religiosity is also increasing. 
77 percent of the youth of Dagestan identified themselves as “strict 
believers” in 2010, whereas in 2000 only 53 per cent did so.37
However, the Islamic revival in the North Caucasus included the 
encounter with other, non­traditional strains of Islam, such as Wah-
habism, which was becoming popular among the Caucasian youth. 
Organized in their own largely non­violent congregations (jamaat), 
37 Halbach U., Isaeva M., “Dagestan: Russia’s Most Troublesome Republic,” SWP Re-
search Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs (August 2015) 16, 2016, p. 10.
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Wahhabis were eager to purify Islam and restore the tawhid (mono-
theism) in Caucasus; therefore, they criticized rites of non­Islamic 
origin and the worship of saints and sheikhs, prominent in the Sufi 
tradition. In response, Muslim elders branded critical younger Mus-
lims as extremists; this created a dichotomy between “official,” tradi-
tional Sufi Islam and the “untraditional,” “imported” Wahhabi­Salafi 
Islam, which characterizes Caucasus up to today.38
In the last decade, the jihadi insurgency spread across the North 
Caucasus, while the focus gradually shifted from Chechnya to the 
republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino­Balkaria. This 
originated from the clashes between state authorities and Wahhabis, 
where all forms of Islamic dissent were cracked down; identifica-
tion of such dissidents often relied on religious garment, untrimmed 
beards or frequent mosque attendance. The brutality of the state au-
thorities toward these suspects, coupled with the popular disillusion-
ment of the judicial process, led to the escalation of Islamist­inspired 
violence, as new, more radical jamaats emerged or moderate ones 
were radicalized. As Islamist groups are viewed with suspicion by all 
local governments in the North Caucasus, and as the authorities are 
still repressing any form of opposition, more and more young Mus-
lims are drawn to fundamentalist, Islamic resistance groups in order 
to elude repression.39
The unsatisfactory social conditions in the North Caucasus, main-
ly high unemployment and widespread corruption, are another ex-
planation that lead young people to believe that an Islamic state will 
restore social justice and equality. Many jamaats promise to reduce 
criminal violence, impose law and order and end corruption, while in 
Karachay­Circassia, jama’ats provided assistance and employment 
38 Petrodaskalaki C., “Aspects of Political Islam in the North Caucasus, Middle East 
Flashpoint,” Centre for Mediterranean, Middle East & Islamic Studies 74, 2016, 
p. 74.
39 Russell J., “Chechnya: The Monster in the Mountain,” The World Today 66 (5), 2010, 
p. 13.
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to those losing their jobs.40 However, it is important to note that, 
despite the widespread militancy, radicalization came primarily in 
the form of peaceful and non­violent enclaves that emphasized on 
education, and only a small, yet extremely active part of the youth is 
finding its way to the forests among the fighters. 
The growing ethnoreligious factor produces various sociocul-
tural tensions and creates psychological pressure on individuals. At 
present, there is no coherent discourse or political movement toward 
secular independence in the North Caucasus, implying weak links 
between security problems and ethnonationalist sentiment. Rather, 
ideological elements prevail in the still ongoing attacks. Radica­
lization, which had happened as a result of the wars in Chechnya, 
weakened the connection to the original cause, but created linkages 
between groups developed during the fighting. Regarding the Dages-
tan Republic, it is characterized by a religious patchwork. The two 
main tendencies remain the Wahhabis and the Sufis. One of the major 
problem is that in the last 20 years, Wahhabis lost intellectuals who 
had a political platform and who could cooperate and debate with the 
Republic’s authorities. This leads to the rise of unsystematic violence 
from them, and the simplification of their battle to the level of ter-
ror against security and power structures. Nowadays, Dagestan is the 
Republic with more clashes in the region; however, they still haven’t 
reached a level that would justify the application of the term “war.”41 
Spaces for dialogues exist, such as the Congress of Nationalities, 
convened recently, and the media remains relatively free. Dagestanis 
are highly religious and this is reflected in the sociopolitical life of 
the Republic that appreciates the constructive role religion can have.
40 Sagramoso D., “Violence and Conflict in the Russian North Caucasus,” International 
Affairs 83 (4), 2010, pp. 689–690.
41 Yarlykapov A., The Radicalization of North Caucasian Muslims, Russia and Islam: 
State, Society and Radicalism, London & New York: Routledge, 2009, 321 p.
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The risk situation in the North Caucasus is currently characte­
rized as a protracted insurgency. Some of the newly­radicalized 
groups, having espoused the Global Jihadi ideology, resolve in ter-
rorist and guerilla tactics, although anti­Western sentiments were 
not as intense.42 It is believed that recruitment is the primary focus 
of ISIS in the North Caucasus. It is estimated that there are already 
15 000 combatants of “Wilayat Qawqaz,” in addition to around 2 400 
fighters from Caucasus, especially Chechens, who have joined ISIS 
ranks in Syria and Iraq. ISIS­affiliated groups have carried out their 
first attacks in the North Caucasus, such as the attack in southern 
Dagestan in December 2015.43
It seems that the Caucasus Emirate is becoming irrelevant to those 
combatant radicals who want to be part of a transnational Islamic 
project. However, many local commanders still refuse to join ISIS 
and submit to foreign leadership. While some believe it is unlikely 
that the ISIS will fully supplant the homegrown Emirate, the swi­
tching of allegiance by many fighters may entail employing ISIS 
methods. Arguably, in the next years, it is possible for a different 
type of Caucasian Jihad to develop.44 On the other hand, in Che­
chnya, there is a different form of political Islam in place that might 
be called pro­state. Sharia norms are applied, such as dress code and 
ban on alcohol consumption, while issues like polygamy or honor 
killings are officially endorsed, in violation to the Russian Federa-
tion’s Constitution. In 2008, the largest mosque in Europe was built 
in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and the Republic has generously 
invested on restoring Sufi holy sites and the creation of new ones.45 
42 Matveeva A., Oliphant C., Russell J., Sagramoso D., The North Caucasus: Islam, Se-
curity, Politics, REP Meeting Summary: The North Caucasus, Chatham House, 2012, 
128 p.
43 Malashenko A., Islamic State Menaces Dagestan, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016, 50 p.
44 Ibid.
45 Yemelianova G., “Islam, Nationalism and State in the Muslim Caucasus,” Caucasus 
Survey 1 (2), 2014, p. 11.
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Thus, by allegedly creating an Islamic order, R. Kadyrov projects a 
moral dilemma, which makes many non­belligerent, potential sup-
porters of the insurgents complacent.46 In terms of armed conflicts 
and insurgency, Chechnya is going through a period of relative calm-
ness; however, one cannot talk of genuine pacification in Chechnya, 
first due to the repressive character of the regime, and second because 
local ethnoreligious conflicts and terrorist attacks continue to take 
place.
In analyzing the role and status of civil organizations in conflict 
resolution processes in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino­Balkaria, 
H. Aliyev notes, 
While civil society’s function of ensuring transparency within state insti-
tutions is decreasing, large circles of the population become disaffected 
with the state and opt to support the insurgency. In conjunction, pressed 
by the state and driven by donor priorities, the majority of NGOs ope­
rating in the region do not heavily involve in development and human 
rights issues in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino­Balkaria, instead 
focusing on humanitarian aid and other service delivery functions. In the 
absence of a functional civil society, local surrogates of NGOs are prone 
to act as their substitutes. Although the latter are failing to ensure democ-
racy and civil freedoms, instead further exacerbating inter­confessional 
and clan cleavages. Often presented as grass­root civil society, jamaats 
of Dagestan and teips of Ingushetia, due to their limited capabilities, 
cannot implement conflict resolution without a third party intervention. 
Regardless of whether the escalation of violence can be linked to the de-
cline of civil society, conflict resolution still requires civil participation 
and is unlikely to be successful if only implemented from the top­down. 
Thus, in spite of the actual causes of the current escalation of violence 
third party involvement is needed from the bottom­up. This can only 
be done by non­governmental organizations, needed to reach out to the 
masses and connect them to those on the top.47
46 Münster A., The Rise of Islamic Extremism in Central Asia and the Caucasus, World 
Watch Monitor, 2013, 126 p.
47 Aliyev H. Aid, “Efficiency in an Armed Conflict. The Role of Civil Society in the 
Escalation of Violence in the North Caucasus,” IFHV Working Paper 1 (1), 2011, 
pp. 40–54.
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3. Conflict Resolution Strategy as a North Caucasus  
Integration and Peacebuilding Resource
The current conflict in the North Caucasus is distinctly different from 
both Chechen Wars not only due to the fact that most conflict­related 
violence is now taking place outside of Chechnya, but also in terms 
of the goals and objectives of its participants as well as the political 
environment. In comparison to the Chechen issue, the current conflict 
is no longer ethnic and is no longer a nationalist one. A simple glance 
at Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino­Balkaria suggests that they do 
not even share common geographical borders, and their population 
is different linguistically, culturally, and with distinct structures of 
societal organization. Nationals of these seemingly different republics 
are parts of the same conflict and pursue the same common goal, 
that of independence from Russia. In spite of assumptions suggested 
by a number of scholars,48 the conflict in the North Caucasus is far 
from being a case of religious fundamentalism, fueled by global 
jihadism. Although religion plays the role of an ideological driving 
force for insurgency, it cannot be considered as the main cause of the 
conflict. Nations inhabiting the North Caucasus, in spite of their strict 
religious adherence, have never been known to follow the radical 
tenets of Islam and were not known for religious fundamentalism. 
V. Tishkov in his discussion on the causes of Chechen conflicts 
describes the Chechen motivations as separatism that “is born and 
its protagonists (both the leaders and the rank­and­file participants) 
are mobilized on the basis of the doctrine and political practice of 
ethnic nationalism. This holds that each people – understood not as 
48 Dannreuther R., “Islamic Radicalization in Russia: An Assessment,” International 
Affairs 1 (86), 2010, pp. 109–126; Ferris­Rotman A., “Global Jihad Creeping into 
Russians Insurgency,” Reuters Analysis, March 4, 2010, p. 23; McGregor A., Military 
Jamaats in the North Caucasus: A Continuing Threat, Jamestown Foundation, 2006, 
249 p.; Shlapentokh D., “The Rise of the Chechen Emirate? Middle East Quarterly 
15 (3), 2008, pp. 49–56.
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a territorial association (demos) but as an ethnic community (ethnos) 
or ethno­nation – has the right to self­determination, to – its own‖ 
state.”49
The North Caucasus escalation of social anomie and disintegra-
tion amplifies radical ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, intolerance, 
isolationist tendencies, ethnic regionalization, and religious extre­
mism. Xenophobic and ethnonationalist ideas are widely spread in 
the post­Soviet Russian society. The slogan “Russia for Russians” 
is to some degree or another supported by the majority of interview-
ees since the beginning of 2000s; in 2011, it was supported by 58% 
of interviewees.50 The actualization of anti­conflict and the inclusive 
mechanisms of civil integration are associated with the necessity to 
develop a secular and supraethnic model of macrosocial consolida-
tion that supports cross­ethnic cooperation and cross­cultural dialog. 
Civil integration, as a social process of supporting and promoting 
human rights and civil institutions in the traditionalist North Cau-
casus society, becomes the primary method of resolving ethnic and 
religious conflicts.51 According to J. O’Loughlin and F. Witmer, 
The conflicts in the North Caucasus have evolved from a frontline in 
Grozny, the Chechen republic, in the early stages of the war in 1999–2000 
to a scattered pattern of guerrilla warfare on Russian forces and local 
allies by a myriad of locally­based rebels as this pattern of fragmentation 
is evident in the local violence density scores and maps after 2006. What 
remains uncertain though is why this fragmented pattern has developed 
and is intensifying? What accounts for the fact that one community 
has produced a mobilized anti­Russian population while adjoining and 
similar communities remain quiescent? In these differences lie a real aim 
49 Tishkov V., Understanding Violence for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Chechnya, 
Geneva: Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN), 2009, 
p. 14.
50 Levada­Tsentr, Nationalism in Contemporary Russia, press release of February 4, 
2011.
51 Popov M., “Sociocultural Integration and Resolving Identity Based Conflicts in the 
North Caucasus,” Indian Journal of Science and Technology 9 (29), 2016, pp. 70–77.
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of disaggregated study of civil war, one that must take the local context 
of such activity much more seriously.52
One of the first Russian concepts of conflict resolution strategy in 
the North Caucasus was V. Tishkov’s ethnological analysis, dedicated 
to the Chechen conflict settlement. According to V. Tishkov, 
The instability in Chechnya and the adjacent North Caucasian lands, 
as well as the crisis of Russia’s statehood in the period of its deep 
transformation, generate large­scale violence on a routine everyday basis 
with poor prospects for stability and reconstruction. Before starting major 
reconstruction programs something should be done to bring into political 
and public discourse the attitudes which clean the road of the conflict and 
do not close the door for the Chechens to exercise these shared identities. 
There is no Russia­Chechnya identity disposition. Otherwise, Chechens 
are excluded from the country’s populace justifying not only atrocities 
on the part of the military but also a politics of caging representatives 
of the whole group into a category of no­citizens or enemy citizens 
without rights and privileges. This is an impossible start for post­conflict 
reconstruction.53
M. Kramer described the most destructive North Caucasus 
conflict in Chechnya as a stalemate since the rebels “continued to 
inflict enough damage on Russian soldiers to erode their morale 
and create the appearance of an endless, unwinnable war,”54 but in 
2006, the Russian government claimed that the war was won and 
that the rebels had routed.55 However, as the war was winding down 
in Chechnya after 2004, the conflict intensified in the region as a 
52 O’Loughlin J., Witmer F., “The Diffusion of Violence in the North Caucasus of Rus-
sia, 1999–2010,” Environment and Planning A 44, 2012, pp. 178–201.
53 Tishkov V., Understanding Violence for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Chechnya, 
Geneva: Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN), 2009, 
p. 26.
54 Kramer M., “The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s War in Chechnya,” Interna-
tional Security 29, 2004, pp. 5–63.
55 Baev P., Has Russia Achieved a Victory in Its War against Terror? PONARS Memo 
415 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1800 K Street, NW, Wa­
shington, DC, 2006, 209 p.
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whole.56 By 2009, significantly more violent events were occurring 
in Ingushetia and Dagestan, the republics adjoining Chechnya to 
the west and to the east.57 In a region where the biggest concern of 
ordinary people is economic insecurity and where corruption is rife 
and barely concealed, many young men have turned to radical Islam. 
The attacks by the state forces on Islamists has furthered radicalized 
many and produced a tit­for­tat upsurge in violence by local military 
jama’ats (militant Islamic communities) who have increasingly 
attacked the organs of the Russian state and its local representatives 
(police, military and political figures).58 By 2008, the Chechen rebel 
leadership was integrating their separate military campaign with the 
wider opposition to Russian presence in the region under the aegis 
of the “Caucasian Front.” This latest chapter of the North Caucasian 
conflicts has not yet reached its dénouement, though predictions 
of wider and deeper conflicts are common despite the President’s 
declaration of the end of “counter­terrorism actions” in Chechnya in 
2009.59
The specifics of identity­based conflicts as threats and challenges 
of integration of the North Caucasus is that they are a collision of 
competing values and ethnic identities. The idea of value­oriented 
collision clarifies the concept of regional conflict as identity­based 
conflict, emphasizing the essence of this explanatory model.60 From 
the structural point of view, regional conflicts appear as an effect of 
escalation of ethnoconfessional contradictions between Islam and 
56 Markedonov S., “The Caucasian Cauldron,” Journal of International Security Affairs 
19, 2010, pp. 123–128.
57 Kuchins A., Malarkey M., Markedonov S., The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile 
Frontier, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1800 K Street, NW, 
Washington DC., 2011, 370 p.
58 Markedonov S., “The Caucasian Cauldron,” Journal of International Security Affairs 
19, 2010, pp. 123–128. 
59 Zhukov Y., “Roads and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence: The Logistics of Conflict 
in Russia’s North Caucasus,” Political Geography, No. 31, 2012, pp. 144–156.
60 Popov M., “Sociocultural Integration and Resolving Identity Based Conflicts in the 
North Caucasus,” Indian Journal of Science and Technology 9 (29), 2016, pp. 70–77.
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Christianity, social inequalities and ethnic mobilization, threatening 
civil integration in the polyethnic society. In contemporary Russia, 
internal conflicts have become obviously ethnoreligious. Over a 
half of civil conflicts after the Second World War are classified as 
ethnic or religious. The identification of the ethnic conflict as an 
antigovernmental rebellion on behalf of an ethnic group is a ground 
for classifying the ethnoregional internal conflict.61 Fearon and Laitin 
argue further: 
With the spike in internal wars after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the then­UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros­Ghali, issued the 
UN Agenda for Peace in 1992. The report identified four overarching 
tasks for the UN and others to undertake preventive diplomacy, peace-
making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. These proposed goals intro-
duced a broader conflict resolution research and policy agenda, beyond 
the emphasis on strategic bargaining and deal making. It effectively ex-
tended conflict resolution concerns to both latent and active conflicts 
and to the increasingly difficult challenge of rebuilding so­called failed 
or failing states. In doing so, it called for understanding conflict dyna­
mics within and between identity groups as well as governments and for 
exploring how relationships between such groups could be sustainably 
transformed – beyond negotiated settlements – such that violence would 
not recur.62
Even if ethnoregional society has not experienced recent conflict, 
W. Kymlicka has suggested that a too­rapid introduction of liberal 
multiculturalism policies (or “interculturalism” or “diversity policies” 
as others prefer to call them) may carry the risk of destabilization. He 
notes: 
Liberal multiculturalism is easier to adopt where liberal democracy is 
already well established, and where the rule of law and human rights 
are well protected. In countries where these basic foundations of 
61 Fearon J., Laitin D., “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” The American Political 
Science Review 90 (4), 1996, pp. 715–753. 
62 Babbitt E., Hampson F., “Conflict Resolution as a Field of Inquiry: Practice Informing 
Theory,” International Studies Review, No 13, 2011, p. 46.
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liberal democracy are not yet present or consolidated, some level of 
democratization and liberalization may be needed before it makes sense 
to push for the full implementation of liberal multiculturalism.63 
He points out that international organizations must sometimes 
strike a delicate balance between justice for ethnic minorities and 
indigenous peoples and security fears about the destabilizing 
effects of ethnic politics on democracy and development.64 While 
W. Kymlicka believes that liberal multiculturalism policies can 
contribute to freedom, equality, democracy and civil integration, he 
urges policy makers to understand the context where they are being 
introduced: “The underlying conditions, the nature of the ethnic 
groups involved, and the types of policies being considered.”65
Civil integration falls into a class of policy problems that J. Chap­
man has described as “messes.” J. Chapman characterizes policy 
“messes” this way: messes are characterized by no clear agreement 
about exactly what the problem is and by uncertainty and ambiguity 
as to how improvements might be made, and they are unbounded 
in terms of the time and resources they could absorb, the scope of 
enquiry needed to understand and resolve them and the number of 
people that may need to be involved.66 Policy “messes” founded on 
complex systems are also distinguished by a variety of perspectives 
on the problem, based on the different mental frameworks used 
by the various stakeholders. These perspectives are not limited 
to differences in academic disciplines, but may also arise from 
“different contexts, different cultures, different histories, different 
aspirations and different allegiances.”67 As a result, stakeholders may 
63 Kymlicka W., Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of 
Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 32.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 19.
66 Chapman J., System Failure: Why Governments Must Learn to Think Differently, 
London: Demos, 2002, 236 p.
67 Ibid., p. 31.
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not agree on the nature of the problem or may dismiss as irrelevant 
the differing perspectives on it, which do not fit within their frame of 
reference. For this reason, it is seldom possible to approach a policy 
“mess” using a linear or rational model of policy or decision making, 
since there is never a single, correct way to address it.
Civil integration reduces ethnic tension, which is associated 
with a high level of solidarity and safety, an attenuation of ethnic 
mobilization and a reduction of a negative stereotypization of 
“others” as “cultural ene mies.”68 While analyzing the role and status 
of religion and ethnicity in the dynamics of regional sociocultural 
conflicts, one should point out a relation between group identities 
and primordial values of closed traditional societies, where civic 
self­awareness and individualism do not play any evident ideological 
role. Currently, such societies may function in the globalized world 
by means of preserving their own culture, based on collective values; 
group identification is correlated within such collectives with ethnic 
values and religious traditions. According to J. Rothman, an appeal 
to individual interests cannot patch a crack as a result of ethnic 
contradictions, if we are deal ing with an ethnic group­wide collision 
in the process of conflict mediation; attempts to manipulate groups 
may lead to identity­based conflict.69
International cooperation, based on solid legal and operational 
measures, and the exchange of information in the external dimension 
of counter­terrorism are crucial in the fight against foreign terrorist 
fighters, the financing of terrorism, the combat and prevention 
of radicalization, reinforced border checks and illegal trafficking 
of firearms (Skocajic Juvan, Grizold 2017: 260). According to 
E. Babbitt, 
68 Popov M., “Sociocultural Integration and Resolving Identity Based Conflicts in the 
North Caucasus,” Indian Journal of Science and Technology 9 (29), 2016, pp. 70–77.
69 Rothman J., Alberstein M., “Individuals, Groups and Intergroups: Understanding the 
Role of Identity in Conflict and Its Creative Engagement,” Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 28 (3), 2013, p. 647.
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Negotiation and conflict resolution concepts provide powerful lenses 
through which to assess conflict dynamics and design appropriate 
strategies for moving these dynamics in a constructive direction. The 
biggest challenge in building bridges to policy is in transferring not 
only the checklist of ‘best practices’ but also the essence of analyzing 
international relationships through the conflict resolution lens. We have 
made good progress in this direction to date, and the signs are promising 
for the collaboration between theory and practice to deepen in the next 
decade. The prerequisites of such collaboration include the ability of 
governments to admit that they do not have all the answers and can learn 
better ways of dealing with conflict and for scholars to fully appreciate 
the constraints under which policy makers are operating and gear their 
analysis to these realities.70
According to H. Aliyev, in the North Caucasus,
good governance, capacity, and civil society building efforts conducted 
by both local and international aid groups are continuously encountering 
corrupt and uncooperative authorities. In most cases, these authorities 
are not interested in changing the existing situation and due to their 
loyalty to the federal government, are considerably immune to criticism. 
As a result, development, human rights and democratization efforts are 
bogged down in bureaucracy and corruption. The aid organizations do 
not prioritize the conflict resolution: only a handful of peace­building 
efforts have been ever implemented in the region and mostly of a low 
scale and capacity. Therefore, growing violence is continuing to serve as 
a major factor affecting the efficacy of development and human rights 
efforts.71
Identity­based conflict has its own unique latent and complex 
traits and some of these elements will be more evident than the other; 
nevertheless, they all are common denominators of the genesis of 
such deep­rooted and destructive conflict. The primordialist approach 
70 Babbitt E., Hampson F., “Conflict Resolution as a Field of Inquiry: Practice Informing 
Theory,” International Studies Review, No. 13, 2011, p. 46.
71 Aliyev H. Aid, “Efficiency in an Armed Conflict. The Role of Civil Society in the 
Escalation of Violence in the North Caucasus,” IFHV Working Paper 1 (1), 2011, 
p. 54.
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helps to explain the potentially conflictogenic nature of radical 
ethnicity and cultural intolerance; the concept of ethnic entrepreneurs 
explains how institutional factors and ethnic stereotypes interact 
each other. Ethnicity and religion are the embodiment of a powerful 
emotional stress that may be re­activated, provided the groups are 
aware of a threat to the ethnicity, religious values and group interests, 
which leads to ethnification, ethnic intolerance and, ulti mately, 
violent ethnic conflict.72
As violence increases, the “security dilemma” will become more 
acute and the desire for peaceful and cooperative strategies of conflict 
management will weaken.73 This will tend to thwart the prospects 
for successful negotiations unless instruments of outright strategic 
leverage and coercive diplomacy can be found.74 Once violence has 
reached a threshold where no further escalation is possible without 
major costs, the disputants may be willing to consider other alterna-
tives than the use of force. However, ethnoreligious conflicts get stuck 
in the middle range of the escalation curve, i.e., violence is ongoing 
and episodic but not sufficient to make the idea of a political solu-
tion an attractive alternative. Such conflicts are sometimes referred 
to as protracted or intractable conflicts, because they are marked by 
self­sustaining patterns of hostility and violence; they have multiple 
sources or causes – identities, values, self­interest, security dilem-
mas, inequalities – and there is no apparent end in sight to large­scale 
ethnic violence. “Lacking any apparent deadline, impending disaster, 
or sense of time shifting to the other side’s advantage, these conflicts 
can be sustained for years unless others intervene and encourage the 
72 Blagojevic B., “Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework,” Journal of 
Global Change and Governance, No. 3, 2009, pp. 3–18.
73 Lake D., Rothchild D., “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict,” International Security 21 (2), 1996, pp. 41–75.
74 Corbin J., The Norway Channel: The Secret Talks That Led to the Middle East Peace 
Accord, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994, 150 p.; Hampson F., Nurturing 
Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 1996, 328 p.
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parties to change their strategic calculus and consider their negotia-
tion options.”75
Essential risk factors in the North Caucasus and Chechen Repub-
lic are called by V. Tishkov as the absence of consistent and well­
funded Russian state policy of post­conflict reconstruction; political 
disintegration, alienation and social disorientation of the civilian 
population; widespread human rights abuses; the internationalization 
of ethnic conflicts and external support for separatists.76 Protracted 
conflicts are a consequence of the re­actualization and radicaliza-
tion of politicized ethnicities. Social inequalities, fragmentations and 
polarizations serve as systemic factors that determine the acuity of 
ethnic tension and escalation of identity­based conflicts in the North 
Caucasus. The analysis of social tension escalation and cultural iden-
tity mobilization suggests a destructive action of factors of ethnore-
ligious intolerance and political disintegration in a region. Identity­
based conflicts are not only armed or political and legal standoffs, but 
also the conflicts of different historiosophies, historical and cultural 
val ues and symbols. This gives rise of a phenomenon of competing 
cultural and historical traditions, most often such antagonism of reli-
gious or ethnic traditions within a multinational society, a fight for the 
historical heritage (constructionists write, not without a reason, that 
there are not any objective historical facts, they are actually a pro­
duct of interpretation of those with more or less rights to legitimate 
nomination of such facts) or conflicts between traditions of represen-
tatives of different social groups. A bitter rivalry of religious as well 
as ethnic traditions is possible in a multiconfessional and multiethnic 
society; an opposition of regional tradi tions, a fight for determining 
the essence of the conflict and an establishing of the causes of a such 
75 Crocker C., Hampson F., Aall P., Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the 
Hardest Cases, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004, p. 31.
76 Tishkov V., Understanding Violence for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Chechnya, 
Geneva: Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN), 2009, 
140 p.
117M. Popov. MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CONSTRUCTIVE  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
conflict etc. Such a “war of interpretations,” a fight with the help of 
one selected subset of historical facts or another becomes a prologue 
of acute North Caucasus conflicts.77
According to the Saferworld 2012 report, people across the region 
recognize the need to combat violent extremism, but a majority 
disagrees with the way this is pursued by security authorities, or 
finds it ineffective. In fact, the methods used by security agencies 
are perceived not only as unlawful, but also cruel, including shooting 
and tortures, leaving local society suspicious of their fairness and 
making it hard to solicit community cooperation. Moreover, since 
some extremists lead a normal life, it is difficult for the authorities 
to identify them, so the whole population, especially young men, 
come under suspicion. This does not help to create an environment of 
transparency and trust. The climate in Dagestan and Chechnya is still 
tense and violence can develop in several directions. In Dagestan, 
the religious factor is undoubtedly the leader in destabilizing the 
republics as it functions as the main ideological banner to unite 
different dissatisfied groups under one wing. In Chechnya, even if the 
security situation has highly improved since 2008, the discontent with 
the social situation, which carries tensions between the population 
and the authorities, is still very high. In both cases, the ones who are 
more dissatisfied and willing to change are the youth, especially the 
educated ones, who do not see how they can realize themselves in a 
rigid and corrupted society.78
The analysis of relation between the ethnic tension and sociocultural 
identity at the North Caucasus regional level leads us to the idea of 
the destructive effect of ethnocultural controversies, conditioned by 
77 Popov M., “Sociocultural Integration and Resolving Identity Based Conflicts in the 
North Caucasus,” Indian Journal of Science and Technology 9 (29), 2016, pp. 70–77.
78 Yarlykapov A., The Radicalization of North Caucasian Muslims, Russia and Islam: 
State, Society and Radicalism, London & New York: Routledge, 2009, 321 p.; Yu-
supov M., “The Social Situation in the Chechen Republic: Problems and Trends,” 
Saferworld, March 2012, <www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/chechnya>.
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social fragmentation and disintegration, dissatisfaction in the basic 
needs of equality, justice and security. In the empirical study of the 
ethnoconfessional relationships and the development prospects in 
the North Caucasus, it is pointed out that interethnic relationships 
in the region can be characterized as stably tense ones. Alongside 
with that, neither the former, nor the latter are viewed as the acutest 
problems and rank 11 and 15, respectively, out of the 16 suggested 
in the social problems topicality rating. This result proved to be 
slightly unexpected, given the character of the place occupied by the 
ethnonational problems range in the social and political discourse 
in the region. According to the respondents, the problems which 
are common for the entire country are the most relevant: corruption 
and bribery (48.5%), prices and taxes growth and inflation (46.5%), 
unemployment (38.6%), the rise in crime (34.9%); the housing 
problem and the communal service problems (32.8%). Although the 
respondents have estimated the probability of interethnic conflicts 
as average, in conditions of a stable tension, any conflict, regardless 
of its true causes, can quickly turn into an interethnic one. For such 
circumstances, perceiving the actions of people of other nationalities 
as a potential threat to one’s own nationality security is characteristic. 
The situation that has formed creates favorable conditions for 
ethnoconflict mobilization – a quick uniting of people in accordance 
with their national sign for participating in the conflict actions. The 
high tension in interethnic relationships is the main reason in why 
regional conflicts, having an interethnic component, keep breaking 
out within the North Caucasus.79
Regional identity­based conflicts are dangerous in the way their 
gen esis and dynamics present social dissatisfaction that is highly 
politicized; and the action of extremism and violence sets implies 
concentrating an aggressive poten tial in the point of ethnic intolerance 
79 Avksentiev V., Shulga M., “The Multinational Stavropol Territory: A Stronghold of 
Stability or Crossroads of Problems?” Sociological Studies 12 (3), 2013, pp. 34–42.
119M. Popov. MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CONSTRUCTIVE  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
and confessional irreconcilability. The degree of violence in identity­
based con flicts is determined by the intensity of inter­ethnic tension 
and social dissatisfaction, and the scope of institutional support and 
political mobilization being the conditions of armed con frontation.80 
According to V. Dudouet, 
Although non­state armed groups represent primary stake­holders in 
contemporary political conflicts, there is still little understanding among 
policy­makers or scholars of the internal drivers and dynamics which 
shape their radicalization and de­radicalization processes. For instance, 
one often hears the assertion that bringing rebel leaders and so­called 
“spoilers” to the negotiation table or converting them into peaceful 
politicians requires weakening, splintering, or completely dismantling 
their militant structures.81
In analyzing current peacebuilding and conflict resolution practice 
in the North Caucasus, H. Aliyev notes: 
It is possible to identify a number of priority areas for peace­builders. 
First, peace­building has to target wide circles of the population possibly, 
starting with grass­roots, such as current and potential rebel recruits, 
supporters, sympathizers, as well as the local population in areas of 
insurgent activity. It is necessary to ensure that peace­building efforts 
are targeting the most affected by the conflict segments of population. 
Second, peacebuilding has to include not only rebel force but most 
importantly security and military of North Caucasian republics, as well 
as similar structures at the federal level. The growth of authoritarianism 
and its onslaught on civil society, accompanied by centralization and 
militarism, are one of the main reasons for the current escalation of 
violence. Decentralization and demilitarization of local and federal 
governments might be considered as one of the main long­term objectives 
to de­escalate the conflict.82
80 Popov M., “Sociocultural Integration and Resolving Identity Based Conflicts in the 
North Caucasus,” Indian Journal of Science and Technology 9 (29), 2016, pp. 70–77.
81 Dudouet V., “Intra­Party Dynamics and Political Transformation,” International 
Journal of Conflict and Violence 6 (1), 2012, p. 34.
82 Aliyev H. Aid, “Efficiency in an Armed Conflict. The Role of Civil Society in the 
Escalation of Violence in the North Caucasus,” IFHV Working Paper 1 (1), 2011, 
p. 54.
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Non­Violence International in CIS (NIS) began its peacebuil­
ding efforts in the Republic of Karachay­Cherkessia and the border 
regions between Chechnya and Dagestan. Its main goal is conflict 
prevention and de­escalation as well as reconciliation and rehabilita-
tion in conflict­affected societies. The NIS peacebuilding program 
focused on conducting peace trainings to youth in the remote regions 
of Dagestan and Ingushetia. In 2001 and 2002, the NIS launched a 
number of programs designed to increase interethnic reconciliation 
and peacebuilding in the border regions of Chechnya and Dagestan. 
Programs aimed to reduce tensions between Dagestani and Chechen 
villagers in border regions after the invasion of border districts of 
Dagestan by the Chechen­led Islamist brigade in 1999 (which was 
the start of the Second Chechen Campaign). Two separate programs 
have been also implemented in Karachay­Cherkessia and Kabardino­
Balkaria. Both had goals of increasing interethnic tolerance and con-
flict prevention in multiethnic settings (Non­Violence International, 
Projects 2009). According to the data provided by the Non­Violence 
International group, most of its funding, used to implement peace-
building programs in the North Caucasus, is from private sources.83 
In 2005, the NIS launched the North Caucasus Regional Peacebuil­
ding Program.84 The program intends to cover almost all of the Rus-
sian North Caucasus (except Stavropol) and its primary goals are 
peacebuilding, regional development, interethnic and interconfes-
sional tolerance.
The problem­solving workshop is one type of third­party assisted 
dialogue, undertaken by both official and non­governmental actors in 
the North Caucasus. This activity is directed at ethnic, racial or reli-
gious groups who are in a hostile relationship. Like “circum­negotia-
83 Non­Violence International, Operational and Methodological Implementation of 
Multi-Sector Peace-building Programs, Moscow 2010.
84 Non­Violence International, North Caucasus Regional Peace-building Program of 
Civil Organizations Based on Sub-Regional Peace-building Action Agenda of North 
Caucasus NGOs, Moscow 2005.
121M. Popov. MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CONSTRUCTIVE  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
tion,” this dialogue occurs at a quasi­official level around or prior to 
the formal peace process.85 Dialogue is directed at officials and civic 
leaders, including heads of local non­governmental organizations, 
community developers, health officials, refugee camp leaders, eth-
nic/religious leaders, intellectuals and academics. This dialogue pro-
cess can be assisted by specialized training programs that are directed 
at exploring ways of establishing and building relationships, furthe­
ring proficiency in facilitation, mediation and brokering, data collec-
tion, fact­finding and other kinds of cooperative decision­making. As 
L. Kriesberg notes, much of this activity is directed at developing 
“constituency support for peace efforts.”86
Conclusions
The North Caucasus conflict, studied in this article, is often called 
a separatist insurgency struggling to establish a sovereign Islamic 
state on the territory of the Russian North Caucasus, i.e., in Chech-
nya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino­Balkaria, North Ossetia and 
Karachay­Cherkessia. However, this study makes an assumption that 
the current ethnoreligious conflict is an outcome of poor governance 
and conflict management, political disintegration and abuses of basic 
civil rights and freedoms.
This research pursues the goal of analyzing how the strength of 
civil­political integration can affect conflict resolution and peace-
building. It suggests that the lack of bottom­up peace efforts ema-
nating at the community and civil society levels (rather than state 
initiatives from top­down) is one of the main causes for the failure of 
85 Saunders H., “Prenegotiation and Circumnegotiation: Arenas of Peace Processes,” 
Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Wa­
shington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, 358 p.
86 Kriesberg L., “Varieties of Mediating Activities and Mediators in International Rela-
tions,” Bercovitch J. (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Prac-
tice of Mediation,  Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1996, p. 30.
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conflict resolution, which, in conjunction with increased state inter-
ventionism, leads to the dramatic escalation of violence in the case 
under study. The fundamental obstacles to resolve ethnoregional con-
flicts – and major contributing factors to insurgency – remain civil 
disintegration, anomie, ethnic intolerance, social inequalities and 
large­scale corruption at all levels of regional and federal administra-
tion. This increases citizens’ alienation from the state and promotes 
the search for radical alternatives, including the Islamic State (ISIS) 
and jihad. In recent years, deep social frustration is a major conflict 
driver. The authorities are perceived as unable to solve either struc-
tural concerns or daily problems. Many feel that local elites have 
privatized the state. Those who want better services try to leave, in-
creasing pressure on neighboring regions and Russia’s big cities. The 
situation is further complicated by alternative concepts of ethnopoli-
tics and statehood. Islamists instrumentalize social problems and of-
fer a non­democratic state based on Sharia (Islamic law) that they say 
will be better equipped to deliver social justice. Growing civil dis-
integration, unresolved social problems and ineffective institutions 
contribute significantly to the appeal of radical ethnonationalism and 
Islamist ideology, erode trust in the state and are a major reason why 
the North Caucasian conflicts are so difficult to solve.
Realistic and achievable goals of conflict resolution as civil inte-
gration resource in the North Caucasus are: 
1)  Strengthening the rule of law and the protection of human 
rights; 
2)  Democratization and meeting the basic needs of the popula-
tions; 
3)  Ensuring personal security for the North Caucasus people; 
4)  Civil society building and socioeconomic development;
5)  Improving cultural relations between North Caucasus ethnici-
ties and the larger Russian society. 
The need to stimulate civil­political integration is caused by mor-
al and structural causes: from the ethical point of view, the creation 
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of an inclusive society is the fundamental societal goal; structural 
factors are related to the need to reduce inequalities and differences 
leading to social fragmentation and escalation of destructive ethnic 
conflicts. In discussing conflict resolution strategies, it is necessary 
to consider the following: 1) The peace and integration of North Cau-
casus is a macropolitical project, the content of which is determined 
by issues of social cohesion and civil solidarity; 2) The development 
of the North Caucasus after the end of armed ethnic conflicts shows 
the inadmissibility of political demodernization, fundamentalism and 
isolationism. Today, the North Caucasus remains a crucially geopoli­
tical macroregion, as it forms the southern volatile frontier of Russia. 
In this case, conflict resolution strategy must serve as an integrational 
and preventive tool on the conflict environment by way of providing 
structural solutions for deep­rooted sociocultural antagonisms, trans-
forming and rationalizing ethnoregional contradictions.
All of these issues would merit further analysis though comple-
mentary methodologies offering a more independent perspective on 
ethnoregional conflict dynamics. In particular, the findings gathered 
here call for more in­depth research on the boundaries between po-
litical integration/conflict resolution strategies and different forms 
of ethnic conflicts in the North Caucasus, on the internal dynamics 
and decision­making involved in shifting goals and strategies and on 
their various implications for the processes of ethnoreligious radi-
calization and political integration. There also needs to be a more 
interdisciplinary investigation on the linkages between conflict reso-
lution strategy, social cohesion, political integration, negotiations, 
democratic transitions and post­conflict institutionalization. Finally, 
such analysis might offer useful lessons for constructive international 
engagement to support the conversion of state challengers into active 
peacebuilders, as long as these actors are politically motivated move-
ments, which enjoy strong social legitimacy and aspire to take part 
in democratic politics. Indeed, our findings call for a rethinking of 
conventional intervention in ethnopolitical conflicts, promoting the 
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social cohesion and civil integration during negotiations, offering as-
sistance to support democratic transitions in the North Caucasus that 
possess a future role within a peaceful environment, all in contrast to 
criminalization strategies (e.g., through anti­terrorist measures, such 
as proscription and counter­insurgency), which prevent ethnic groups 
from expanding their civil capacities.
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SUMMARY
MAJOR THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CONSTRUCTIVE 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
This article explores the major approaches to the study of conflict resolution strategy 
from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives. It argues that conflict resolution 
strategy, as a civil integration resource, is a necessary tool for overcoming deep­
rooted ethnic conflicts in the unstable North Caucasus. This research pursues the 
goal of analyzing how the strength of civil integration can affect conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding. The author considers the essential factors of protracted ethnic 
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conflicts and emphasizes the destabilizing role of the repoliticization of ethnicity 
in a crisis society. The concept of ethnic, “identity­based” conflicts is the heuristic 
theoretical model of exploring causes for increased ethnoreligious tensions in the 
North Caucasus. This article focuses on the ability of conflict resolution strategy to 
de­escalate growing tensions and transform protracted identity­based conflicts. The 
need to stimulate civil integration is caused by moral and structural causes: from the 
ethical point of view, the creation of an inclusive society is the fundamental societal 
goal; structural factors are related to the need to reduce inequalities and differences 
leading to social fragmentation and an escalation of ethnic conflicts. Among the 
structural conditions of regional conflicts, the author names ethnosocial inequalities, 
a civil identity crisis, ethnopolitical neo­authoritarianism, large­scale socioeconomic 
polarization and an “ideological combat” between secular modernization and religious 
fundamentalism. While discussing conflict resolution strategies, it is necessary 
to consider the following: 1) Peace and integration within the North Caucasus 
is a macropolitical project, the content of which is determined by issues of social 
cohesion and civil solidarity; 2) The development of the North Caucasus after the 
end of armed ethnic conflicts shows the inadmissibility of political demodernization, 
fundamentalism and isolationism. Today, the North Caucasus remains a crucially 
geopolitical macroregion, as it forms the southern volatile frontier of Russia. In this 
case, conflict resolution strategy must serve as an integrational and preventive tool 
on the conflict environment by way of providing structural solutions for deep­rooted 
cultural antagonisms, transforming and rationalizing ethnoregional contradictions.
